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THE FRASER OF ALLANDER 
INSTITUTE 
QUARTERLY ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
October 1977 
REVIEW OF THE QUARTER'S ECONOMIC TRENDS 
The World Economy 
The present posit ion and outlook might be depicted as follows. 
The recovery can be considered to be reasonably well established 
in the US, which alone in the developed world has seen a strong 
revival in business f ixed investment. I t is also the only major 
economy where unemployment, currently averaging 7% of the 
c i v i l i an labour force, seems unlikely to r ise further in the next 
year. Real GDP growth is l i ke l y to be of the order of 5% 
annually during both 1977 and 1978. The current account of the 
balance of payments seems set to remain in substantial de f i c i t up 
to the middle of next year. In part this ref lects substantial 
o i l imports, and so i t s effects on the trade balance of the 
developed world may not be large. 
Act iv i ty in Germany has been almost stagnant during most of 1977, 
and ear l ie r projections of 5% real GNP growth now seem at least 
one percentage point too high. Industr ial production has scarcely 
grown since the beginning of the year, ref lect ing the weak 
performance of a l l components of f i na l demand. The domestic 
consequences are l i ke ly to be a further contraction in overall 
employment. However, policy changes announced recently may lead 
to GNP growth of 5% in 1978. Most of the stimulus should come 
through increases in real take home pay, and an expanded public 
investment program. The annual rate of increase in consumer 
prices is l i ke ly to be of the order of 4% both this year and next. 
Reflationary action has also been taken in Japan, where the GNP 
target of 6.8% in 1977 may be achieved. The policy changes w i l l 
serve to increase public capital spending and to a lesser extent 
consumer spending. Their impact on import demand is unlikely to 
be large. The rise in consumer prices w i l l be of the order of 
10% this year, f a l l i ng to perhaps 8% in 1978 under the influence 
of an appreciating yen and a moderate wage round this year. The 
OECD envisages that real GNP growth may be of the order of 6% 
annually t i l l 1980. 
In France, overall demand remains depressed. Government 
measures to stimulate investment and to i n i t i a t e direct employment 
programs have recently been announced. The overall ef fect is 
l i ke ly to be a repeat of this year's low GNP growth of Z\% in 1978. 
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Nor is much progress l i ke l y in further reducing the rate of 
i n f l a t i o n , which is l i ke ly to average 9-10% annually during both 
years. Measures to reduce the age of retirement to 60, and cash 
grants for those who emigrate, seem unMkely to stem the current 
r ise in unemployment, which may well stand at 5% of the labour 
force next year. 
Growth in I t a l y is l i ke l y to be of the order of 2% in 1977, and 
somewhat lower s t i l l in 1978. Sustained def lat ion of domestic 
demand may bring the current account balance into equil ibrium 
this year, and may reduce the annual rate of increase of consumer 
prices from i t s present level of 20% to something approaching 15% 
by the f i r s t ha l f of 1978. Sweden, which foremost amongst the 
Scandinavian economies had maintained employment and production 
during the recession, is now faced with the necessity of making 
the real income adjustment thus postponed. Her problems are 
complicated by r i s ing i n f l a t i o n , the highest un i t wage costs in 
Europe, and as a consequence stagnant manufactured exports. 
What then are the reasons for the fa l te r ing world-wide recovery? 
To an extent pol icies have been too successful. In many countries 
incomes pol ic ies have been too e f f i c i en t in depressing real wages, 
with consequent effects on consumer demand. In turn this has 
led to slow recovery of corporate turnover and pro f i t s and 
consequently to a very sluggish revival of business f ixed 
investment. Final ly f isca l policy has been less stimulatary 
than expected owing to underestimation of the effects of f isca l 
drag, and a fa i l u re in many cases to meet government spending 
targets. 
Unemployment Rates - Major World Economies 
June 1976 June 1977 
United States 7.8 7.1 
Japan 2.0 2.1 
Germany 4.1 4.3 
United Kingdom 5.5 5.9 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, September 1977 
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The UK Economy 
Reference to what are generally regarded as 'key indicators' 
offers the temptation to be opt imist ic with regard to the present 
performance and future prospects of the UK economy. The trade 
figures for September show a strong current account surplus of 
£266 m i l . with the v is ib le Dalance of trade in surplus at £91 mi l l ion 
and the underlying trend indicates a current account surplus for 
this year, with the prospects of an even greater surplus in 1978 
assured by the impact of North Sea o i l . 
At the same time, the strengthening of an already f i rm pound has 
brought the Bank of England into the re la t ive ly unfamiliar role 
of acting to hold down the rate of exchange. The demand for the 
pound has been such as to result in the accumulation of foreign 
reserves to record levels ($17 b i l l i o n ) that compare favourably 
with those of Japan and the USA. While this state of af fa irs is 
encouraging, a note of caution is required: a substantial part 
of such reserves may be speculative in nature and prove to be 
extremely v o l a t i l e , and could be repatriated f a i r l y quickly. 
There may also be a sense of optimism generated by the government 
remaining within the l imi ts imposed by the IMF on the rate of 
increase in money stock (M3), and i t s Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR). With respect to the PSBR, the government 
may have about £1 b i l l i o n of headroom available giving i t a 
degree of purchase should i t decide to act in a ref lat ionary 
manner. 
S imi lar ly , encouragement can be derived from the slow down in the 
rate of i n f l a t i on - the Bank of England forecasts i t to be under 
13% by the end of this year. And, given the obvious weight i t 
attaches to i t , the government might also derive some encouragement 
from the fact that the TUC leadership prevented outr ight rejection 
of i t s vision of a Phase 3 - 1 2 months between settlements and 
an upper l i m i t of 10% - in the face of considerable rank-and-fi le 
dissat isfact ion with the workings of Phases 1 and 2. But 
government optimism on this w i l l be tempered by the real isat ion 
that pressures from the shopfloor may prove i r res t i b le to the 
union leaders. Indeed, the government's wages 'po l icy ' w i l l be 
tested soon by Ford, Br i t ish Leyland, and others such as the 
lorry drivers. 
There i s , however, another side to what Mr H J Witteveen of the 
IMF has recently called the "astonishing" success of Br i t ish 
government f inancial po l ic ies. I t is clear that the real 
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economy remains in c r i s i s . Unemployment has been allowed to r ise 
to post-war record levels : an unadjusted to ta l of 1.61 mi l l ion 
(which would be over 1.8 mi l l ion except for stop-gap attempts at 
job preservation and creat ion), or 6.1% of the workforce. The 
National Ins t i tu te expects unemployment to continue to r ise into 
1978. Alongside th is rise in unemployment, there has been a f a l l 
of some 6% in real disposable incomes over the last year. 
On the production s ide, product ivi ty remains low compared with our 
main competitors, and in the f i r s t hal f of 1977, the level of 
economic ac t i v i t y as measured by GDP f e l l to a level 1% below the 
1973 peak, with manufacturing ac t i v i t y par t icu lar ly depressed. 
In addi t ion, UK industry is operating with levels of excess 
capacity which.according to the Bank of England, are the highest 
in 30 years, and is undergoing a s ign i f icant r ise in unplanned 
stockbuilding. Further, at the sectoral level the UK economy 
has heavy commitments in terms of employment and capital employed 
in areas that are experiencing chronic world over-capacity, e.g. 
s tee l , shipbui ld ing, synthetic t e x t i l e s , and which w i l l not lend 
themselves to any short-run solut ions. 
I t seems clear then, given the overall conditions of excess 
capacity, the deep flaws in the UK industr ia l s t ructure, and 
current low levels of demand, that we cannot rea l i s t i ca l l y look to 
an investment-led recovery from industry i t s e l f . And, since any 
stimulus from the world economy seems equally remote, then 
stimulation of the economy must come from the government in the 
f i r s t instance. 
The indications are that now the IMF has given the word, the 
Chancellor is now seriously considering the introduction of some 
fiscal measures of a mildly ref lat ionary nature comprising a cut in 
d i rect taxes and possibly some attempt at a winter works programme. 
However, there are so l id grounds for believing that this w i l l 
amount to too l i t t l e and too late to stem the r ise in unemployment. 
F i rs t l y cuts in d i rect taxes are l i ke l y to be delayed so that any 
expenditure-stimulating effects w i l l seep through in the Spring 
of 1978 at the ear l ies t . Secondly, i t is possible that any cuts 
in direct taxes w i l l i n i t i a l l y resul t in people readjusting the i r 
savings and not spending the extra money in the i r pockets - as 
seems to have been the case in Germany since the recession set i n . 
A f i n a l , and more general, retarding influence on attempts at 
demand-side stimulation aimed at increasing employment l ies in 
the exist ing s i tuat ion of unplanned stockbuilding experienced by 
manufacturers and dist r ibutors in 1977, along with excess capacity: 
thus even i f consumer demand should r ise with tax cuts, there 
w i l l be a substantial lag before this is reflected in a sustained 
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expansion of production and employment. This analysis is 
reinforced i f there has been a s ign i f icant degree of labour 
hoarding - that is i f firms have held on to workers in the 
recession because they are sk i l l ed or expensive to pay-off, and 
whom they would expect to require in the upturn - and where 
workers have been retained under such measures as the Temporary 
Employment Subsidy, who would otherwise have been 1 aid-of f . The 
existence in s ign i f icant numbers of such groups of workers means 
that in the upturn of the economy or industries affected, there 
w i l l be no immediate tendency to hire new workers as the exist ing 
workers are capable of coping with expansion at the outset. 
Indeed, given the scale of f ixed costs incurred per worker 
(insurance contributions e t c . ) , companies may for a time prefer to 
expand production on the basis of the exist ing labour-force 
workinq overtime. Al l of these factors cal l into question the 
efficacy of relying on direct tax cuts to cure a problem that 
needs tackl ing now. 
Given these clear l imitat ions of d i rect tax adjustments and given 
that stimulation of the economy is required now i f there is to 
be any hope of reversing the trend in unemployment by mid-1978, 
then we have to look at al ternat ives. A general reduction in VAT 
would have the immediately v is ib le effect of reducing prices. 
But this would be merely a cosmetic ef fect in that the same 
employment-creation constraints apply as with cuts in direct taxes, 
and in that the ef fect on the rate of i n f l a t i on would be a once-and-
fo r -a l l e f fec t , and would go no way to tackl ing the roots of 
i n f l a t i on . 
I t is clear that the government must face up to the need for an 
immediate s ta r t on a programme of public works. This would 
include the bui lding of roads, but especially the building and 
rennovation of hospitals, schools, technical colleges, sheltered 
housing for the e lder ly , and local authority housing to meet the 
needs of the poorest sections of society who are generally priced-
out of the private sector. Such a programme could be met in part 
by the estimated £1 b i l l i o n headroom available in the government's 
PSBR as defined by the IMF. Indeed, the net cost to the 
exchequer would be low when consideration is taken of the savings 
on welfare and social security payments, and the recoupment of 
taxes and insurance contributions from those who were formerly 
unemployed and who become employed as a d i rect or indirect result 
of such a programme. 
Apart from the f iscal advantages of a public capital-works 
programme, there are others related to the nature of the bui lding 
and construction industry. F i r s t l y , the industry is in severe 
distress with unemployment at more than double the national 
average. I f i t is to be saved from further deterioration then i t 
needs the reinstatement of the projects which war* shelved under the 
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public expenditure cuts of the last year or two. Secondly, this 
sector is re la t i ve ly labour-intensive and st imulation should meet 
some early success in reversing the trend in unemployment in that 
industry at least (though a potential bottleneck in job expansion 
here is the apparent shortage of craftsmen, a problem not confined 
to the construction industry). Thi rd ly , the construction 
industry is re la t i ve ly low in import content and would not place 
any great s t ra in on the balance of trade. F ina l ly , such a 
programme has the advantage of producing what is needed in th is 
society. 
However, the indications are that the Chancellor intends to retain 
his present conservative f isca l and monetary pol ic ies together 
with considerable reliance on wage res t ra in t . Such a course of 
action w i l l ensure a continuing r ise in unemployment in the coming 
year. No amount of wage rest ra int on i t s own w i l l engender the 
necessary st ructura l changes required i f the UK economy is to 
develop the levels of productivi ty and international competitiveness 
enjoyed by our main trading partners and competitors. 
Indeed, eyen a programme of public works, with or without tax cuts, 
is on i t s own merely a return to the fami l iar short-run orthodoxy 
whose l imi tat ions are expressed in the history of post-war economic 
cr ises. Unaccompanied by major f i sca l and ins t i t u t i ona l changes 
of a long-term nature, the economy w i l l lurch along in a stop-go 
manner, with unemployment f a l l i n g , but to a new higher 'natura l ' 
rate only to be subjected to further cycl ical increases; balance 
of payments problems w i l l recur and i n f l a t i on w i l l continue to 
d is to r t economic re lat ions. 
The actual form and content of a long-term strategy would require 
a greater consideration than is possible here. However, some 
indication can be given of j us t a few of the issues that should 
be subjected to c r i t i ca l analysis. For example in the area of 
regional po l icy , there must be questions asked of a policy frame-
work that apparently acts in a manner unfavourable to the 
expansion of employment - that i s , a system of grants that encourges 
more capital- intensive projects and proves to be an expensive 
method of creating jobs (e.g. see July 1977 issue of the Commentary 
on the cost of jobs at Moss Morran). The corol lary of this is 
that the abol i t ion of the Regional Employment Premium (REP) should 
be reviewed with the aim of restoring i t in some form. 
At the same time there should be a more c r i t i c a l at t i tude adopted 
to the role of the giant corporations in the economy; for one 
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thing, they favour capital- intensive methods to such an extent that 
there must be a question mark placed against the i r ab i l i t y to of fer 
future job expansion opportunit ies; and secondly, given the calls 
from a l l parts of the po l i t i ca l spectrum for a greater role to be 
given to small businesses in the economy, there has to be an 
evaluation of whether the existence and ac t iv i t ies of the mul t i -
national and state monopolies impinges on the a b i l i t y of small 
businesses to ident i fy and make use of growth opportunities. The 
existence of such concentrations of corporate capital questions the 
notion that small businesses w i l l prosper and grow in economic 
importance by the mere manipulation of the tax system: there are 
more fundamental barriers ranged against small businesses, and i t 
w i l l require ins t i tu t iona l changes in conjunction with f iscal 
change to engender growth from this area. 
Other problems that require to be tackled as part of a long term 
plan aimed at rev i ta l i s ing and res t r i c t ing the Br i t ish economy 
include the question of t ra in ing and technical education. At 
the moment we are in the posit ion of having record-levels of 
unemployment coupled with a shortage of sk i l l ed manpower in 
certain sectors. At the same time and related to the question of 
t ra in ing and retraining is the human and material waste involved 
in the uncontrolled decline of firms and industr ies. 
For example, when a steel works closes, s k i l l s are suddenly 
wr i t ten-o f f and the worker finds d i f f i c u l t y in getting a suitable 
job. Clearly what is required is a policy for ident i fy ing those 
industries and firms where phased withdrawal is required and a 
re- t ra in ing , and i f necessary, a re-location scheme, for servicing 
the requirements of growth industr ies. 
I t is of course easier to indicate these problems than i t is 
to actually draw up the means of implementing such a long-term 
strategy. There would be great costs involved, and mistakes 
would continue to be made. And yet i t is now, when the problems 
are clearest and revealed by the extent of the industr ia l 
depression, that the opportunity to finance a new deal that would 
modernise and restructure Br i t i sh industry, is being presented in 
the form of o i l revenues. Such an opportunity w i l l pass quickly 
and w i l l not come again. A question mark must be raised as to 
whether the ins t i tu t iona l preconditions exist that would permit 
such an industr ia l revolution today. 
